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ABSTRACT
Analyzing Global Cyber Attack Correlates Through an Open Database
Brady Aiello
As humanity becomes more reliant on digital storage and communication for ev-
ery aspect of life, cyber attacks pose a growing threat. However, cyber attacks are
generally understood as individual incidents reported in technological circles, some-
times tied to a particular vulnerability. They are not generally understood through
the macroscopic lens of statistical analysis spanning years over several countries and
sectors, leaving researchers largely ignorant of the larger trends and correlates be-
tween attacks. This is large part due to the lack of a coherent and open database
of prominent attacks. Most data about cyber attacks has been captured using a
repository of common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE’s), and “honey pots”, un-
secured internet-connected devices which record attacks as they occur against them.
These approaches help in the process of identifying vulnerabilities, but they do not
capture the real world impact these attacks achieve. Therefore, in this thesis I create
a database of 4,000 cyber attacks using a semi-open data source, and perform an-
alytical queries on it to gather insights into how cyber attack volume varies among
countries and sectors, and the correlates of cyber attack victims. From here, it is also
possible to relate socio-economic data such as GDP and World Happiness Index to
cyber attack volume. The end result is an open database of cyber attacks that allows
researchers to understand the larger underlying forces which propel cyber attacks.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
According to a 2017 study by Cybersecurity Ventures:
Cybercrime is the greatest threat to every company in the world, and one
of the biggest problems with mankind. The impact on society is reflected
in the numbers.
Last year, Cybersecurity Ventures predicted that cybercrime will cost the
world $6 trillion annually by 2021, up from $3 trillion in 2015. This
represents the greatest transfer of economic wealth in history, risks the
incentives for innovation and investment, and will be more profitable than
the global trade of all major illegal drugs combined [57].
According to a study by Hiscox Insurance on cyber attacks in 2017 across the US,
Great Britain, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands, involving 4,103 organizations
in private and public sectors, the average annual cost due to cyber attacks to a single
business is $229,000, and %73 of organizations were not prepared for a cyber attack
[47]. For organizations with more than 1,000 employees, the average annual cost of
total cyber incidents was $356,000 in Spain, and $1.05M in the US [47]. The largest
firms in the US lost $25M annually to cyber crime, while the largest firms in the Great
Britain and Germany lost $20M [47]. Businesses with fewer than 100 employees lost
between $24,000 on average in Spain to $63,000 on average in Germany [47]. The
greatest cost for a single incident ranged from $800,000 in Spain to $5M in Germany,
and the US in the middle at $2M [47]. Cyber crime presents a substantial and growing
threat to both the private and public sector.
Cyber security incidents also cost individual consumers. The WannaCry attack
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of May 2017 affected 300,000 machines, and cost $4B [47]. The attack, carried out
by North Korea, disabled the machines of users all around the world, promising to
free them for a ransom, an instance known as “ransomware” [34]. The attacks hit
hospitals in Great Britain especially hard, impeding medical work, and risking lives
[34]. In September 2017, Equifax experienced a data breach exposing the information
of 145 million Americans, and some citizens of Great Britain and Canada, exposing
their Social Security numbers, dates of birth, driver’s license numbers, driver’s license
dates and states, home addresses, and credit card numbers [29].
As computers become more ingrained in human life, cyber attacks even have the
capacity to kill. In 2017, a pacemaker model implanted in 465,000 people was recalled
over concerns about holes in its security that could let a hacker drain the battery or
alter the heart’s rhythm arbitrarily [45]. In July 2017, a security researcher demon-
strated how a popular internet-connected car wash system could be commandeered
from anywhere in the world to attack anyone inside the car wash [65]. Full adminis-
trator privileges were granted by entering the default password “12345” [65].
Car washes are one example of large equipment connected to the internet. How-
ever, in industrial settings, there are many types of internet-connected physical equip-
ment which may be exposed to cyber criminals. The rise of industrial attacks puts the
safety of an entire population at economic and physical risk. In December 2015, the
Ivano-Frankivsk region of Western Ukraine experienced a loss of power after cyber at-
tackers remotely took control of the cursors of employees at 3 power stations, changed
their passwords, shut off power to every region they managed, disabled backup power,
reset employee passwords, leaving 230,000 residents without power [68]. Between 2005
- 2010, a worm was discovered on computers and industrial programmable logic con-
trollers (PLC’s) which manage Iran’s nuclear program [31]. The join effort between
the US and Israel degraded Iran’s nuclear centrifuges was highly sophisticated, only
targeted machines related to the nuclear program, faked sensor data on the machines,
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destroyed 1/5 of its nuclear centrifuges by spinning them out of control, and went
undetected for 5 years [31] [67]. Politically motivated attacks against public infras-
tructure pose an imminent economic and physical threat to all people.
Figure 1.1: Projection of Worldwide Total M2M devices, created by
Statista.
Increased internet connections and traffic will expose more machines to cyber
attacks. Cisco explains 4 reasons that network usage are likely to become significantly
larger in the near future: an increase in internet users, more machine-to-machine
(M2M) devices, faster internet speeds, and increased video viewing. From 2016 - 2021
users are projected to increase from 3.3B - 4.6B, M2M devices will increase 17.1B -
27.1B, average broadband will increase from 27.5 Mbps - 53.0 Mbps, and video viewing
will increase from 73% - 82% of total traffic [21]. All of these advances expose more
people and more machines to cyber threats. The increase in IoT (M2M) devices, as
estimated by Statista [19], and shown in figure 1.1, is particularly concerning, because
these are often unsecure. According to a 2017 study by the Ponemon Institute, 80%
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of IoT applications are not tested for vulnerabilities [41]. This is understandable, as
an influx of countless cheap IoT devices streaming from many manufacturers means
that there is not much funding available for security testing, and that there is a litany
of development platforms of varying security.
It is clear that Cyber crime is a growing and vastly underestimated threat. As the
world puts its businesses, personal lives, personally identifiable information, and credit
card and banking information online, cyber crime is more likely to affect everyone,
not only businesses and governments. Given the growing prevalence of cyber attacks,
it behooves all internet users to understand the large historical trends of previous
cyber attacks, in the hope of predicting future cyber attack behavior.
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of open and organized knowledge about cyber
attacks. The current data sources are discussed at length in chapter 2, Background.
In this thesis, I assemble a database of cyber attacks 2014-2017 without paying for any
data access, by using a semi-open data source. I then make various types of queries
against the database to determine how cyber attack volume changes over time, what
socioeconomic factors exacerbate cyber attacks, and what other unknown facets of
cyber attacks can be discovered. The main results of these questions are as follows.
From 2014-2017, global cyber attack volume peaks August 2016, and the United
States reports the most cyber attacks received. Before August 2016, attacks against
the private sector and governments dominated; after August 2016, attacks against
individuals started to increase, and now are the most targeted victims. Political
and economic cycles play an important role in cyber attack volume. Cyber attacks
sometimes peak 3 months prior to a national election, while others peak directly
following an election, as a means of protest. Wealthier countries receive more attacks,
and in the case of Great Britain, cyber attacks usually peak in November each year.
One interesting discovery is that, following the peak of cyber attacks in August 2016,
by October 2016, cyber attacks were less than half of the peak, and by December 2016
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they approached levels similar to the maximum. Strangely, it seems that after a huge
push for cyber attacks, hackers take a break for 2 months, subsequently returning to
business as usual.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
In this chapter I discuss previous works similar to this thesis, what they teach, and
how my thesis stands apart from rest. Most previous work on global trends in cyber
attacks does not suffice, as it falls into one of the following categories: it discusses
only a subset of cyber attacks, is not statistically rigorous, or does not use an open
data source. No previous work has generated a cyber attack database for public use
as mine does.
In Debeck’s, 2011 MS cybersecurity thesis, “The Correlates of Cyber Warfare: A
Database for the Modern Era”, he discusses the general ignorance and disorganization
of data pertaining to cyber attacks, and proposes a worldwide network of routers to
track attacks as they occur [37]. This hypothetical system would provide perfect
knowledge of the country of origin of any attack, tracking the attack as it passes
through various routers. Debeck’s motivation for such a tremendous undertaking
is the hope of correlating cyber attacks with political, cultural, and socioeconomic
conditions in a way analogous to “The Correlates of War” project which does the
same for natural war [1]. This work’s emphasis on a general void of reliable and open
cyber attack data, which holds true 7 years after its release, was the original impetus
for this thesis. Unlike Debeck, in this thesis, the cyber attack database I create is not
a hypothetical one, but actually created from cyber attack data.
Ghandi’s 2011 IEEE article, “Dimensions of Cyber-Attacks: Culture, Social, Eco-
nomic, and Political” identifies a few dozen cyber attacks that are directly linked
to socioeconomic events [42]. By scouring news articles, and performing in depth
research on the attacks and their motivations, Ghandi makes the case that socioe-
conomic events are a substantial motivator of cyber attacks, and that their crucial
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role in cyber attacks requires further research. However, Ghandi’s does not statis-
tically correlate any socioeconomic factors with cyber attack volume; it is more of
a narrative that connects socioeconomic and political headlines with cyber security
breaches. Ghandi states that, “the movements of Russian troops in Georgia were
correlated with cyber-attacks on the Georgian communications infrastructure and
defacement of government websites.” This is believable given the evidence presented,
but there is no mathematically derived correlation, which is generally a Pearson-R
correlation. Again, Ghandi notes, “[a lack of cyber attacks] seems to reinforce the
notion that attacks are strongly positively correlated to political and cultural con-
flicts”, without deriving the actual correlation. In general, the work is believable, but
of small scope, lacking in statistical rigor, and mostly anecdotal. In contrast, this
thesis rigorously quantifies cyber attack volume for various countries, target sectors,
types of attacks, and the various correlations between types of cyber attacks, as well
with socioeconomic data.
Sharma’s 2013 work, “A Social Dimensional Cyber Threat Model With Formal
Concept Analysis and Fact-Proposition Inference”, the authors describe how to use
the socioeconomic conditions surrounding cyber attacks to server the construction of
a decision tree that can characterize and predict cyber attacks using fact proposi-
tion inference [63]. In the fact proposition inference model used in this work, facts
are inferred from propositions via a Bayesian belief network, where propositions are
analogous to antecedents, and facts are analogous to consequents. Though Sharma
focuses on the ontology of socially-motivated attacks, he claims tangible results from
unnamed cyber attack data sources. For instance, the consequence “Information and
Data Loss”, the victims “Individuals/Civilians”, the means, “Penetration Attempt”,
and the technological aspects, “SQL and Code Injection” all represent the highest
beliefs in their category in the belief network. Unfortunately, the web app created
for this paper is not available, the belief network is never shown in its entirety, and
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the cyber attacks data source is never revealed. All of these factors make the results
difficult to use or rely upon. In contrast, in this thesis I reveal my data source, and
open source my work for others to reproduce.
In her 2014 paper, “Global Mapping of Cyber Attacks” Carley does much of what
I do in this thesis [33]. She quantifies types of attacks, identifies which countries
receive the most cyber attacks, and correlates volume of cyber attacks received with
various socioeconomic data. Carley’s analysis is truly an impressive work, and it
relies upon her previous work of simply creating a database of cyber attacks [56].
Unfortunately, Carley’s work relies upon closed data. The attack signatures are
freely available, but the number of Symantec machines who have experienced an
attack, and the IP addresses of those machines, which makes identifying the nation
of any particular machine affected possible, are all closed source. This was only
possible because Carley and her fellow researchers were granted special access to
Symantec’s World Intelligence Network Environment (WINE) Intrusion Prevention
System’s (IPS) telemetry data. This real world data sampled from over 10 million
machines around the world no doubt allows for the highest quality of data, but it
is infeasible for most researchers. Carley also does not analyze temporal changes in
attack data at all, and only analyzes attacks from November 2009 - September 2011.
In contrast, I only use open data, I analyze temporal and seasonal trends in different
types of cyber attacks and their victims, and I analyze cyber attacks from January
2014 - February 2018, a longer and more recent history.
Aviles’ 2015 master’s thesis in cybersecurity, “How US Political and Socio-economic
Trends Promotes Hacktivist Activity” tries to understand hacktivism, among other
things, by analyzing cyber attack reports from Hackmageddon [25] [60]. Unfortu-
nately, the work is very anecdotal, and only examines cyber activity in December
2014 and January 2015. The only charts and results obtained are mere reproductions
from Hackmageddon [60]. This work is not statistically rigorous, but a qualitative
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approach to seeing cyber attacks through a socioeconomic lens. I also use Aviles’
data source. However, in this thesis I perform rigorous statistical analysis.
Kumar’s 2016 research paper, “DDoS Cyber-Attacks Network: Who’s Attacking
Whom?”, analyzes global trends in DDoS attack behavior [51]. DDoS, or Distributed
Denial of Service, is a type of attack in which a machine is overwhelmed by the
network requests made by thousands of machines in different geographical locations,
causing the victim machine to become unavailable. Using open DDoS data from Dig-
ital Attack Map [6], Kumar discovers that, from May 2013 - March 2016, the top
10 victims of DDoS in descending order are the US, China, Peru, France, Canada,
Poland, Great Britain, Brazil, Germany, and South Korea. The top 10 DDoS aggres-
sors in descending order are China, the US, the Netherlands, Germany, South Korea,
Brazil, Great Britain, Russia, France, and Turkey. Kumar notes that the country of
the attacker is only known for about 1
3
of the attacks. It is similar to what I achieve in
examining international relationships with respect to cyber attacks. However, as this
work only examines DDoS attacks, one of many types of attacks, it is more limited in
scope, than my own. I examine all types of cyber attacks, and I analyze many other
aspects of cyber attacks than the aggressor country and victim country.
Solano’s 2017 IEEE conference paper, “Socio-economic Factors in Cybercrime”
progresses Ghandi’s work with much more statistical rigor, correlating cyber attack
incidents with 32 socioeconomic factors, including GDP PPA, unemployment, polit-
ical stability, freedom of press, happiness, access to broadband internet, population,
and life expectancy [64]. The cyber attack incidents are derived mainly from reports
from www.hackmageddon.com [60], and socioeconomic sources are derived from the
World Bank [15], the International Labour Organization [10], Freedom House [8],
Polity IV [54], Reporters Without Borders [14], Transparency International [13], Cre-
dendo Group [4], and The Economist Intelligence Unit [3]. Solano’s work is one of
the more complete studies on the socioeconomic correlates of cyber crime to date,
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but all results that are not extremely strong correlations are discarded. Solano be-
lieves that only 3 correlations, all greater than 0.80 and with p-values all less than
0.05, are important enough to discuss. Discussion of interpretation of Pearson cor-
relations and p-values is in section 3.7. Solano notes 2 other statistically significant
results with correlation greater than 0.60 disparagingly. This is a great disservice, as
Pearson correlations greater than 0.50 are considered strongly correlated [36]. It is
therefore very likely that Solano obtained many important results which will never
see the light of day. Solano finds that in Syria, the correlation between political risk
and the number of attacks received is (r = 0.864, p = 0.012), in Mexico, the corre-
lation between lending interest rates and attacks received is (r = 0.840, p = 0.036),
and that in Ghana, the correlation between GDP and attacks received is (r = 0.821,
p = 0.045). Additionally, the correlation between the perception of corruption of
Russia and attacks on Australia to be (r = 0.642, p = 0.025), and the correlation
between the perception of corruption of Lithuania and Australia to be (r = 0.639),
with a “similar” p-value. The authors of this paper are dissatisfied with the results,
concluding, it “has not been able to find definite correlations between security in-
cidents and the socio-economic variable of the countries involved”, citing the under
reporting of cyber attack incidents as a likely source of error [64]. By contrast, in
this thesis, I reveal all of my results, including many in which there is no statistically
significant correlation between cyber attack features. This is scientifically honest, and
allows other researchers to replicate the results.
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Chapter 3
THE CYBER ATTACK DATABASE IMPLEMENTATION
To organize cyber attack data in a way that is structured, persistent, and easily ac-
cessible from a single endpoint, an RDBMS is selected. This SQL solution allows
researchers around the world to apply data science to cyber attack trends. All other
options are inappropriate. Keeping data in spreadsheets or CSV’s potentially splits
data, does not allow complex queries, and does not enforce any rules for field values.
Storage in document-oriented NOSQL databases such as Dynamo, Mongo, or Redis
would not take advantage of any structure inherent in common data fields. A graph
database such as Neo4j would allow for more complex connections made between at-
tacks, but development time would be much longer, and because graph databases like
Neo4j require learning a niche query language, the end result would not be accessible
to the vast majority of cybersecurity researchers.
The implementation of a cyber attacks database is contingent on the available
data. Finding reliable structured data on attacks can be very difficult, but we show
how it can be done. Then the data is conditioned to fill in missing cells, and make
text values more symmetric. Next, the data is transformed to a SQL-friendly version.
Lastly, the SQL database is created and populated with the cleaned data.
3.1 Open Data on Cyber Attacks
Currently there are no viable open data sources of cyber attacks [37]. This makes sense
because of the following. Private corporations study cyber attack data for sale, so
they aren’t motivated to maintain an open database of attacks. Government agencies
also have their own private data stores on security incidents, but governments secu-
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rity agencies also want to conceal what they know, and could end up exposing their
own state-sponsored attacks. So they are also motivated to keep data secret. Most
individuals do not have the time or resources to maintain a database of cyber-attacks,
which is constantly growing. Hence, most researchers don’t have access to data re-
garding the trends in cyber attacks. Past research has required meticulously collected
articles from security-oriented news sites, such as in Gandhi’s “Dimensions of Cyber-
Attacks”[42]. Other research, such as Kumar’s “Cyber Attacks DDoS Network”[51],
has relied on www.ddosmap.com as a data source for understanding DDoS attacks.
Still other research, such as Solano’s “Socio-economic factors in cybercrime” [64] and
Avile’s “How US Political and Socio-economic Trends Promotes Hacktivist Activity”
[25], has used the data from www.hackmageddon.com to analyze larger cyber attack
trends. This last option covers many different types of attacks (not only DDoS), is
structured, contains enough metadata to make detailed analysis, is semi-open, and
saves researchers the trouble of handpicking cyber attack incidents. Therefore, it is
the sole cyber attack data source used in this thesis.
3.2 Hackmageddon
The site “Hackmageddon” is the labor of security professional Paolo Passeri [59].
Passeri manually collects the cyber attacks data from following many security news
sites, and uploads graphs and charts of them which he uses in a security blog. Users
of Hackmageddon can submit an attack, which Passeri will review, and may include
in the data at his discretion. To gain access to the original data used on the security
blog, this author needed to contact Passeri personally. Thankfully, Passeri freely
opens the data to anyone who asks.
The data is in the form of Excel Spreadsheets, a file for each half of a month, with
data from 2011 to present (March 2018). Excel is Passeri’s primary way of storing and
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analyzing attacks. The fields are as follows: ID, Date, Author, Target, Description,
Attack, Target Class, Attack Class, Country, Link, Tags.
1. ID: An integer unique to that half-month file
2. Date: The date the attack was reported
3. Attack: The type of attack (e.g. DDoS)
4. Target Class: The sector targeted.
5. Attack Class: Cyber War, Cyber Crime, Cyber Espionage, or Hacktivism
6. Country: ISO alpha-2 country code (e.g. US)
7. Link: A URL for a new article describing the attack
8. Tags: Important keywords
Often Author and Target are missing, and for older spreadsheets the Author field is
actually a picture of the country, or hacker organization. For example, if Anonymous
is behind an attack, a .png of a Guy Fawkes mask is often placed in the Author
field.When the Author field is known, the picture must be replaced with the Author
in plain text. Additionally, the Author and Target fields are sometimes empty. If the
Author or Target is made known in the Description field, it must be filled. Otherwise,
the field should have “NULL” as its value. Fields that are left empty, or filled with
a “?” must all be filled with “NULL” as their values. Because a single spreadsheet
holds only half of that month’s cyber attacks, they must also be combined into a
larger spreadsheet to make insights into the higher level attack trends. Filling in
missing data and making field entries consistent requires considerable work, and in-
specting every entry for an entire year, approximately 1000 entries, takes about a
day. Examples of “Attack” include “DDoS” and “Account Hijacking”. Passeri has
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Field Example
Id 16
Date 17-10-2016
Author Guccifer2.0
Target Democratic National Committee(DNC)
Description Guccifer 2.0 is back and leaks new fresh documents
relating to the US political system (documents al-
legedly showing email conversations between DNC
employees and Hillary Clinton’s presidential cam-
paign staff discussing Donald Trump’s position on
his tax returns).
Attack Unknown
Target Class Org:Political Party
Attack Class CC
Country US
Link http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/hacker-guccifer-2-
0-leaks-files-claiming-dnc-researched-donald-
trumps-taxes-1587073
Tags Guccifer 2.0, Democratic National Committee,
DNC, Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump
Table 3.1: The fields of the “attacks” spreadsheets used by Hackmageddon,
and a sample row.
defined 4 abbreviations for Attack Class: CC (Cyber Crime), CE (Cyber Espionage),
CW (Cyber War), and H (Hackitivism). Sometimes this field has the full name of
the Attack Class, and sometimes many attack classes are listed. The “Country” field
refers to the victim country. This is easily determined in instances of cyber war, or
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when a large group of consumer that mostly or solely live in a certain country are
targeted, though some attacks target a few or many countries. In these cases, the
“Country” either lists the ISO alpha-2 country codes of 2-3 countries delimited by
spaces or commas, or may simply read, “> 1”.
3.3 Making the Spreadsheets SQL-Friendly
Using the raw attack data contained in separate spreadsheets proves unwieldy to
deep data analysis. This problem is not assuaged even after they compiled into larger
records. So, they are entered into a MySQL database. There are some issues that
must be rectified first. The “Id” field is only unique across one spreadsheet (half a
month of attacks), and must be unique across the entire database. The “Date” field
is a reserved word in SQL so it is changed to “AttackDate”. The entries are in the
European format, “d/m/yyyy”, instead of the standard SQL format, “yyyy-mm-dd”.
The “Target Class” and “Attack Class” fields contain spaces. So these all need to be
changed to “TargetClass” and “AttackClass”. “Country” is also ambiguous, as a user
may interpret this as the author’s country or the victims’ country. To remove the
ambiguity, this is changed to “TargetCountry”. Another consideration is that though
the “TargetCountry” field may reference another table of country data, sometimes
Passeri’s attack entries have more than one country per entry. Therefore, the “Tar-
getCountry” field cannot be queried by a simple “GROUP BY” query, and cannot be
a foreign key to a countries database. However, this is not a major problem, because
only a few countries experience the majority of attacks, and general SQL commands
are sufficient for seeing major attack trends and correlations. These insights can be
used for more targeted SQL queries that get all attacks where “TargetCountry” con-
tains “US”, such as “US, UK”. The last step is to convert the Excel spreadsheet to a
comma-separated value (CSV) file in UTF-8 format. After these changes are made,
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the fields in Passeri’s spreadsheets map directly to a MySQL schema, which shall now
be described.
3.4 Creating the Cyber Attack Database
After all addressing all the necessary changes to the schema, the creation of the table
is as follows:
CREATE TABLE at tacks (
Id INT(11) PRIMARY KEY AUTO INCREMENT,
AttackDate DATE,
Author VARCHAR( 96 ) ,
Target VARCHAR(256) ,
Des c r ip t i on VARCHAR(512) ,
Attack VARCHAR( 64 ) ,
TargetClass VARCHAR( 72 ) ,
AttackClass VARCHAR( 16 ) ,
TargetCountry VARCHAR( 32 ) ,
Link VARCHAR(256) ,
Tags VARCHAR(512)
) ;
The table 3.2 shows the schema and a sample row.
3.5 Inserting The Data
After creating the database, it is populated with the sanitized data from the spread-
sheets. The dates are reformatted to MySQL syntax form, then converted to UTF-8
encoded CSV’s. The CSV’s are combined into a single file representing a single year of
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Field Type Size Example
Id INT(11) 4 38820
AttackDate DATE 3 2016-10-17
Author VARCHAR 96 Guccifer2.0
Target VARCHAR 256 Democratic National Committee(DNC)
Description VARCHAR 512 Guccifer 2.0 is back and leaks new fresh
documents relating to the US political sys-
tem (documents allegedly showing email
conversations between DNC employees
and Hillary Clinton’s presidential cam-
paign staff discussing Donald Trump’s po-
sition on his tax returns).
Attack VARCHAR 64 Unknown
TargetClass VARCHAR 72 Org:Political Party
AttackClass VARCHAR 16 CC
TargetCountry VARCHAR 32 US
Link VARCHAR 256 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/hacker-
guccifer-2-0-leaks-files-claiming-dnc-
researched-donald-trumps-taxes-1587073
Tags VARCHAR 512 Guccifer 2.0, Democratic National Com-
mittee, DNC, Hillary Clinton, Donald
Trump
Table 3.2: The schema of the “attacks” table in the Cyber Attacks
database, and a sample row. The “Id” field, an auto-incremented inte-
ger, is unusually large solely from adding and removing many entries to
the table in development.
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attacks (again, about 1000/yr). Instead of reading the CSV’s directly into a MySQL
database, it is read into a “dataframe” object, a data type from the “pandas” python
package, for inspection. This lets us double-check that all fields and rows look as
they should, before adding them to the table. Pandas also does a nice job of handling
null values without an explicit NULL in the cell, as well as escaping quotes and other
sequences that are meant to be part of the field entry. After they are inspected,
pandas dataframe objects have a nice to sql() method we use for inserting data into
the database an entire dataframe at a time.
Figure 3.1: Inspecting the attacks as a pandas dataframe in a Jupyter
notebook.
3.6 Querying The Data
SELECT TargetCountry , COUNT(∗ ) as num attacks
FROM at tacks
GROUP BY TargetCountry
ORDER BY num attacks DESC;
The most interesting parts of the data are the volume of attacks per month, and how
attack volume is correlated in various ways. We can get a quick look at attack volume
by simple queries, such as the following one quantifying attack volume by country.
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This produces table 3.3. Often, there are discrepancies in how the TargetCountry
or Sector is recorded, so a more flexible query can gather any attack in which ‘US’
appears, which may be in a field such as “US UK”. So actual volume numbers are
more accurately calculated using a query of the following form:
SELECT COUNT(∗ ) as num attacks
FROM at tacks
WHERE TargetCountry LIKE ”%US%” ;
Doing this repeatedly for the top 12 countries in attack volume produces a more ac-
curate estimate of attack volume. If make “countries” table, we have an easier way
to get more reliable estimates for all countries of the form:
SELECT c o u n t r i e s . CountryCodeTwo , c o u n t r i e s . CountryName ,
COUNT( a t tack s . TargetCountry ) AS num attacks FROM
c o u n t r i e s LEFT JOIN at tacks ON
at tacks . TargetCountry LIKE
CONCAT( ”%” , c o u n t r i e s . CountryCodeTwo , ”%” )
GROUP BY c o u n t r i e s . CountryCodeTwo
ORDER BY num attacks DESC;
After getting an idea of the countries and sectors that are targeted the most, we
can focus on detailed queries to gain insight into cyber attack trends.
3.7 Analysis Overview
The analysis is performed on all attacks recorded by Hackmageddon over the 4 year
period from January 1, 2014 to January 1, 2018. Attack volume by country and
sector are visualized for the countries and sectors that receive the most attacks. The
correlation between attack volume for different sectors and different countries are
analyzed by calculating the Pearson r value and p-value. Recall that statistically
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significant p-values are less than 0.05 and highly significant values are less than 0.01
[40]. Also, recall the following about Pearson Correlation, in table 3.4. This shall
become useful when analyzing the significance of our results.
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TargetCountry num attacks
US 1693
> 1 599
GB 254
IN 124
NULL 110
CA 96
AU 77
RU 71
IL 65
FR 58
KR 57
UA 55
JP 54
CN 47
IT 45
DE 43
PK 40
BR 37
TR 37
NL 27
SA 25
PH 22
Table 3.3: The top 20 countries by attack volume 2014-2017 inclusive, as
queried on the attacks database using a more targeted query for > 1 and
NULL values, and the remainder of countries using the aforementioned LEFT
JOIN technique.
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Pearson Correlation Correlation Interpetted As
0.00− 0.10 very weak
0.10− 0.30 weak
0.30− 0.50 moderate
0.50− 1.00 strong
Table 3.4: The interpretation of Pearson Correlation values [36].
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Chapter 4
CAPTURING SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA
As discussed, previous works have shown a correlation between socio-economic factors
and the volume of cyber-attacks a country receives [64] [42] [25] [37]. Here, we ag-
gregate many socio-economic factors from open sources to study the degree to which
various socio-economic factors influence a country’s volume of attack received. Most
of factors are taken from Heliwell’s World Happiness Report 2015 [49]. The data
included on this web page in the form of Excel spreadsheets and found by clicking,
“Chapter 2 Online Data Expanded with Trust and Governance” contain data on many
socio-economic factors, which shall be detailed in the next section. However, because
GDP was not included in this dataset, only a GDP per capita, whose precision had
been destroyed by dividing by a very large number (population), additional GDP
data is found through World Bank [26]. Two more fields “HappinessRank and “Hap-
pinessScore” are found through a dataset that Sustainable Development Solutions
Network hosts on Kaggle [58]. SDSN is an organization which actively supports the
World Happiness Report [9]. We shall now delve into the contents of these datasets.
4.1 The World Happiness Report
The first World Happiness Report was released in April 2012, and has released one
report annually ever since, with its most recent report being released March 2018
[7]. Here we run 2 analyses: first of which only uses the 2014 data from the 2015
report, and the second of which draws from the aforementioned 2018 report, using
only the data pertaining to years 2014-2017 (inclusive). All data collected in the
World Happiness Report is taken from the World Gallup Poll [9].
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Like the Hackmageddon data, before using the World Happiness Report data, it
all needs to be wrangled [55]. In the first analysis, we are relating the socio-economic
data from 2014 to the total attack volume over the total 2014-2017 period. This type
of analysis assumes that the socio-economic factors relevant to a particular country
don’t vary significantly enough to account for the disparity in overall cyber attack
volume. Conversely, in the second analysis, which compares total cyber attack volume
by year to socio-economic data for that year, assays to relate changes in both year-to-
year. The assumption is that using data from every year could produce more detailed
results, but relating them to the only first year suffices for seeing large trends in how
total attacks received in this 4 year period.
Next, because there are not any columns for ISO alpha-2 or ISO alpha-3 country
codes, only full country names, they must be added. Without them, joining to the
attacks table is error-prone. Then, two-word column names are combined into single-
word names, and all missing values are filled with “NULL”. Many columns are mostly
empty as well, so these areas where data was too difficult to collect are discarded.
Finally, we are left with the following fields.
1. CountryName
2. CountryCodeTwo
3. CountryCodeThree
4. Population
5. Region
6. HappinessRank
7. HappinessScore
8. LowerConfInt Hap
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9. UpperConfInt Hap
10. StudyYear
11. LogGDPperCapita
12. SocialSupport
13. HealthyLifeExpectatBirth
14. FreedomLifeChoices
15. Generosity
16. PerceptionOfCorruption
17. PositiveAffect
18. NegativeAffect
19. ConfidenceInGov
20. DemocraticQuality
21. DeliveryQuality
22. PeopleCanBeTrusted
The fields “HappinessRank”, “HappinessScore”, ”LowerConfInt Hap”, and ”Upper-
erConfInt Hap”, do not appear in the original data from the World Happiness Report,
though “HappinessScore” is simply “LifeLadder” in the original study as outlined in
the WHR appendix [22]. Instead, the auxiliary columns are pulled from the Kaggle
dataset [58] which derived from the original WHR dataset and its annual summary
by a community of data scientists. Additionally, the happiness fields only pertain
to the first inquiry, and in this first overall inquiry, only data from 2015 is used,
25
because there aren’t any datasets with happiness scores from 2014 or prior. Because
socio-economic data does not vary much between years, but varies greatly between
countries, 2014, the earliest year in the cyber attacks database is chosen. The implica-
tion is that socioeconomic conditions at the beginning of the study serve as an input
which affects the output, cyber attack volume, over the subsequent years. To demon-
strate the effects of this slight variability of socioeconomic data, consider how little the
correlation between annual GDP and the total cyber attacks experienced 2014-2017
varies in table 4.1 There are not socio-economic data for 2014 for every country, in
Socio-Economic Factor r p-value
GDP2016 0.186 0.023
GDP2015 0.181 0.026
GDP2014 0.179 0.027
GDP2013 0.176 0.029
GDP2012 0.176 0.03
GDP2010 0.175 0.03
GDP2011 0.172 0.033
Table 4.1: Annual GDP Correlates of Total Cyber Attack Volume Received
2014-2017 in ascending order by p-value.
which case, the most recent data is used. 112 countries are analyzed using 2014 data,
29 countries are analyzed using 2013 data, 8 are examined using 2012 data, 5 using
2011 data, 1 using 2007, and 1 using 2006 data. Most of the countries lacking data
from 2014 are countries which also don’t receive many cyber attacks. Though most
fields are self-explanatory, a few are elusive. The “...ConfInt Hap” fields are the lower
and upper confidence interval of the happiness score,“HealthyLifeExpectatBirth” was
originally “Healthy Life Expectancy at Birth”, “FreedomLifeChoices” in its original
form was “Freedom to Make Life Choices”. The field “DeliveryQuality” is a weighted
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average of several fields. The Statistical Appendix for Chapter 2 of the 2015 World
Happiness Report explains its significances as follows:
Variables in the expanded data set: Democratic and delivery quality mea-
sures of governance are based on Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
project (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi). The original data have six di-
mensions: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law,
Control of Corruption. The indicators are on a scale roughly with mean
zero and a standard deviation of 1. We reduce the number of dimensions
to two using the simple average of the first two measures as an indicator
of democratic quality, and the simple average of the other four measures
as an indicator of delivery quality, following Helliwell and Huang (2008)
[17].
Detailed information about all fields is also available in the same appendix for the
WHR [17].
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Chapter 5
RESULTS
Risk is often defined in the utility function:
R =
N∑
k=1
PrkU(Xk). (5.1)
where Prk is the probability of an event occurring, in the kth state, and U(Xk) is
the utility (loss) function of resource X in state k [52]. Put simply, risk in any partic-
ular state is the probability of adverse event occurring multiplied by the adversity of
the event. In the case of cyber attacks, the utility function often requires information
such as money lost, loss of public trust, number of devices affected, logins stolen, etc.
These are sometimes difficult to come by, and are not included in the Hackmageddon
data. However, the probability that an attack will occur against a particular victim
country or sector could be estimated by measuring the volume of cyber attacks against
a certain country or sector. In this section I discuss the results of analyzing cyber
attack volume. Grouping attack victims by target country and target class (sector)
allows us to identify the most targeted countries and sectors at any granularity of per
diem or greater. This information is valuable because countries and sectors that are
targeted at high frequency can generally expect to be targeted at high frequency in
the future. In other words, a kid who is frequently bullied is at greater risk of future
bullying than a kid who is not. Therefore, by measuring the volume of cyber attacks
that victim countries and sectors receive, I am actually measuring the expected value
of cyber attack volume for a country or sector, which as previously shown, is part
of the risk equation. We measure the probability by taking advatage of the fields
“TargetCountry” and “TargetSector”, using them to make queries of the form,
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SELECT dates . AttackYear , dates . AttackMonth ,
ym. TargetClass , ym. num attacks
FROM dates LEFT JOIN
(SELECT YEAR( AttackDate ) AS AttackYear ,
MONTH( AttackDate ) AS AttackMonth ,
TargetClass , COUNT(∗ ) AS num attacks
FROM at tacks
WHERE TargetClass LIKE ”%Gov%”
GROUP BY AttackYear , AttackMonth , TargetClass ) ym
ON (ym. AttackYear = dates . AttackYear
AND ym. AttackMonth = dates . AttackMonth ) ;
This chapter is divided into By Country, By Sector, and Socio-economic Factors.
In the section By Country 5.1 I give an overall understanding to how attack volume
varies temporally and across target countries, and expound on which country pairs’
attack volume is most closely correlated. Because these two studies don’t share much
overlap, I divide them into two distinct sections. The first answers the first question
of this thesis, “How does cyber attack volume vary with time?” for various countries.
The second answers the third question, “What else can we learn about trends in cyber
attacks?” I perform the data analysis on temporal data, and visualize it via simple
graphs displaying the volume of cyber attacks, as well as Pearson R correlations.
In the Sectors section I perform the same analysis on the most targeted sectors.
Here there is considerable overlap between the most targeted sectors and the most
correlated sector pairs (by attack volume received), so they are addressed in a single
section. I examine cyber attack volume against certain countries and sectors all on
a month-by-month basis. This is a large enough window that attack volume against
minority targets and sectors is nontrivial, but granular enough to answer the first
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question of this thesis. The section “Socio-economic Factors” only covers correlates,
because the census data for these factors are only taken once a year, whereas cyber
attack traffic is analyzed at the smallest level on a month-by-month basis. This lays
the groundwork for understanding the likelihood of attack, one of the components
of risk assessment. The overarching implications of these results are covered in the
Discussion section.
5.1 By Country
Countries that receive the most attacks are often not correlated with one another,
but are of the most importance. Because their is not much overlap between these two
groups, it is useful to break the study into two sections:
1. Trends 5.1.1: Study the cyber attack volume per month of the most heavily
targeted countries in a subsection of their own
2. Correlates 5.1.2: Study the country pairs whose attack volumes are most closely
correlated
5.1.1 Trends
In this section I discuss the results of analyses on temporal data, and their clustering
by month, on the most targeted countries. Clustering by month is easy to do in SQL,
and also is very easily understood by people. Clustering smaller, on a week-by-week
basis is more difficult to visualize over the 4 year period, and loses some meaning.
Clustering on a larger basis, such as by year, obscures how cyber attack volume varies
wildly throughout the year. In figures 5.1 - 5.16 I show the cyber attack volume per
country. By analyzing and visualizing this data we can better understand how the
volume of cyber attacks changes over time for each country. Linear trends, or cyclical
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patterns may appear, which are easier to understand visually.
In figure 5.1 I show the total attack volume between January 2014 and February
2018. Note that figures 5.1 and 5.2 represent a high attack volume relative to the
change in volume, so they are not shown with a y-axis starting at zero. In figure 5.1
the graph is jagged, with a global maximum of 116 attacks in August 2016 followed by
a global minimum of 50 attacks two months later. This jaggedness means that cyber
attack volume is changing dramatically in irregular ways. It may indicate dramatic
changes in socioeconomic conditions. In figure 5.1, I plot the average of total attacks
over the past six months in order to produce a smoother line that helps interpret larger
trends. We see in figure 5.1 that rolling average total attacks generally increases from
the start of the rolling average plot in June 2014 until the global maximum in August
2016, dipping until July 2017, and ramping back up until at least January 2018.
Figure 5.1: The timeline of total cyber attack volume, with a 6 month
rolling average.
The graph in figure 5.2 is strikingly similar to the previous. 5.1. This is due
in large part to the fact that the US receives more attacks than any other country
recorded in this database. As previously shown in 3.3 the US receives more than
6.5 times the cyber attacks as the next most targeted country, Great Britain. As I
illustrate in figure 5.3, the US dwarfs the next 4 most targeted countries by an order
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Figure 5.2: The timeline of US attack volume for the US with a 6 month
rolling average.
of magnitude.
Figure 5.3: Attacks by Country Timeline — Timeline of cyber attack
volume by country for top 5 victims.
Great Britain and India are 2nd and 3rd most attacked countries, respectively.
Their graph in figure 5.4 confirm visually what is discovered through their Pearson
correlation: they aren’t correlated in any significant way(r = 0.248, p = 0.082). All
Pearson correlation values are on a volume-per-month basis, and can be found in table
5.1 . Great Britain has a global maximum of 12 attacks in November of 2015. Great
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Britain has global minima at March 2014 and October 2016. India’s attacks peak
at global maxima 8 in Jan 2014 and Oct 2014, with global minima of zero attacks
recorded at June 2014, Dec 2014, Jan 2015, Sept 2016, March 2017, Nov 2017, Dec
2017, and Feb 2018.
Figure 5.4: Timeline of cyber attack volume by country for Great Britain
and India
By volume of cyber attacks received, Canada and Australia occupy spots 4 and
5 respectively. They are also not correlated in any significant way (r = 0.156, p =
0.279). Canada peaks in July 2015, with 12 months of 50 receiving zero reported
attacks. Australia peaks in May 2015 and August 2015, with 10 months receiving
zero reported cyber attacks.
The cyber attacks reported for the 6 and 7 spots, Russia and Israel, also uncor-
related (r = 0.086, p = 0.552), are increasingly sparse as shown in figure 5.6. Russia
has 13 months with zero attacks recorded, and Israel has 21 such months. There
doesn’t seem to be much here. With few attacks, there doesn’t seem to be much we
can learn. In the next subsection 5.1.2, we will see that that is not necessarily the
case.
In figure 5.7 I show the average cyber attacks per month for the US. The maximum
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Figure 5.5: Timeline of cyber attack volume by country for Canada and
Australia
Figure 5.6: Timeline of cyber attack volume by country for Russia and
Israel
average attacks per month also lands on the global maximum over the four year period,
in August. A quick glance back at figure 5.2 shows that August was not the maximum
for years 2014, 2015, or 2017. Though August was the third highest month in 2014,
the second highest month in 2015, it was the second lowest in 2017. The massive
spike in 2016 therefore played a significant role in making August the highest month
on average for the US.
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Figure 5.7: Average Cyber Attacks / Month for the US.
In figure 5.8 it can be seen that Great Britain’s cyber average cyber attacks peak
in November. Glancing back at 5.4 it is shown that in 3 out of 4 years, Britain’s
cyber attack volume peaks in November.
Figure 5.8: Average Cyber Attacks / Month for Great Britain.
India’s attack volume hits a global maximum on average in October, as seen in
fig 5.9. This behavior is expected, as India’s cyber attack volume peaked in both
October in 2014 and 2015, and October is the fourth most targeted month for India
in 2016 and the fifth most targeted month for India in 2017.
Pakistan’s by month average is shown in 5.9. Because Pakistan is the fifteenth
most attacked nation, at only a sum of 40 attacks over the 4 year period, small
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Figure 5.9: Average Cyber Attacks / Month for India and Pakistan.
bursts in cyber attacks drastically affect the average. Though the average peaks in
October, October was the peak in only 2 years, as shown in 5.14. In 2014, it peaks
in October with 6 attack recorded, more than 3 times the per month average of 1.74
attacks. Additionally, in 2016, the peak is 1 attack recorded, where October shares
the maximum with
Figure 5.10: Average Cyber Attacks / Month for Canada and Australia.
5.1.2 Correlates
Table 5.1 shows the correlation between attacks received volume between the top
twenty attack target countries. The correlation table indicates which countries are
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likely to have similar changes in attack volume during the same month. The reason
may be retaliatory, i.e. country ‘A’ and country ‘B’ may see attacks received increase
at the same time because they are attacking each other. The correlation may also
have a common cause, in the form of political, social, economic instability, or a
common aggressor. This data is of course, not all the data that can be produced with
this new cyber attack database, but produces 190 useful Pearson R correlations. A
20 × 20 correlation matrix render 400 entries, but 20 values along the diagonal are
all r = 1.00, p = 0.00, because any item is 100% correlated with itself with absolute
significance, and the entries on one side of the diagonal are duplicated on the other
side of the diagonal.The r value is the Pearson correlation, where the absolute value
determines how closely they are correlated. This is previous discussed in 3.7. Positive
r values indicate that in general an increase in attacks in one country translates to an
increase in attacks on another country, and negative r values indicate that an increase
in attacks on one country translates to a decrease in attacks against another country,
and vice versa. As discussed in 3.7, p-values are always positive, and the smaller
the more significant, where a value less than 0.05 is statistically significant. The
table is sorted in ascending order by p-value, which indicates statistical significance.
However, this is not the only thing we care about. For instance, if two countries
both have zero cyber attacks reported for the entire 4 years, then they would have
a perfect correlation, with absolute significance. The most correlated countries, with
the greatest significance, are Turkey and the the Philippines in the top row of 5.1,
with a total attack volume over the 4-year period of 36 and 22 attacks, respectively.
Here we may want to focus on countries that have a large to moderate volume of
cyber attacks, and see how they correlate. The US and China are both in the top 5
target countries, and we can see that they are moderately correlated in attack volume
(r = 0.309, p = 0.029).
In the figure 5.11, Turkey and the Philippines have very few attacks, but their
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attack volume is correlated. Out of all countries, it is in fact the most correlated
(r = 0.467, p = 0.001). Though Turkey has a global maximum of 4 attacks in January
2014, its next highest attack month is November 2014. Conversely,the Philippines
has a global maximum in November 2014, and its second highest attack month is one
month after Turkey’s. So, though their 1st and 2nd maxima do not perfectly align,
the collectively occupy a similar temporal space, and behave similarly over the 4 year
period. It is therefore highly unlikely that their correlation is merely due to their both
receiving a low attack volume. Explaining the reasons for many of these correlations
is difficult, but shall be discussed in the Discussion section 6.
Figure 5.11: Timeline of cyber attack volume by country for Turkey and
the Phillipines.
Another one of the strange results of this research is in figure 5.12. It is surprising
to see that Canada and Pakistan are weakly inversely correlated (r = −0.294,p =
0.038) as shown in table 5.1. For much of the graph in figure 5.12 Canada’s attacks
will increase while Pakistan’s will decrease, and vice versa. Possible reasons for this,
and other correlations will be discussed in the Discussion section 6.
I show that Japan and China’s reported attack volume in figure 5.13. As shown
in table 5.1, China and Japan are moderately correlated (r = 0.339, p = 0.016). In
the graph we can qualitatively notice that the volume of attacks received by Japan
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Figure 5.12: Timeline of cyber attack volume by country for Canada and
Pakistan.
generally increases and decreases with those of China.The unique maximum of attacks
received by China (5 attacks) occurs at the same month, January 2016, as one of
Japan’s 3 maxima (3 attacks) over the entire 4 year period.
Figure 5.13: Timeline of cyber attack volume by country for Japan and
China.
As with the previous graph, in figure 5.14, we see that Pakistan and India both
share one of their 2 global maxima in the same month, October 2014. Similarly,
Pakistan’s 2015 maximum occurs 1 month after India’s, and in 2017, Pakistan goes
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from 7 months of zero reported attacks to receiving 2 attacks in August, the same
month that India has its second greatest attack attack volume. 2016 is somewhat less
interesting, because Pakistan only has 5 months of one attack and 7 months of zero
attacks. However, in 2016 both India and Pakistan share a maximum in December.
Running the Pearson correlation, the attacks received by Pakistan and by India are
at least weakly correlated, (r = 0.289, p = 0.042), as one might expect from the
previous visual inspection.
Figure 5.14: Timeline of cyber attack volume by country for India and
Pakistan.
I show Italy and Germany in figure 5.15 are also moderately inversely correlated
(r = −0.356, p = 0.011). Graphically we can notice that Italy reaches its global max-
ima of 3 attacks per month Nov 2014 and Feb 2016, while Germany has zero recorded
attacks. Similarly, as German reaches its maximum of 3 attacks per month in August
2016, Italy has zero recorded attacks. Similar behavior is easily seen for several nth-
most voluminous months, thus giving some intuitive understanding to their moderate
inverse correlation. In general, there are surprising and often inexplicable correlations
The US and China can figure 5.16. Their correlation is more difficult to visualize
because of the order of magnitude difference in attacks reported. They neither share
any global maxima, nor do they share any maxima for the year. However, the US
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Figure 5.15: Timeline of cyber attack volume by country for Italy and
Germany.
and China do share global minima in May 2015 and Nov 2017 (US = 21, CN = 0).
They are moderately correlated (r = 0.309,p = 0.024)
Figure 5.16: Timeline of cyber attack volume by country for the US and
China.
Japan and China are also moderately correlated (r = 0.339,p = 0.016). This can
be visualized in figure 5.13. Japan and China both share a maximum of received
attacks in January 2016, as well as a second-highest attack month in July 2016, and
a third-highest attack month in October 2017. However, they are sometimes very out
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of synce, as in Sept 2014 and October 2016, where Japan reports 3 attacks and China
reports none, or in Oct 2014 in which China reports 3 attacks and Japan reports
none.
5.2 By Sector
Sectors are defined by the “TargetClass” field of the database, originally from Passeri’s
spreadsheets column name “Target Class” as previously discussed 3.2. There are a
total of 629 distinct values of TargetClass. They often have prefixes of “Industry”
or “Org”, which can help organize them better, such as “Industry: Video Games”,
or “Org: Telecommunication”. It often does not seem that Industries and Orga-
nizations are clearly delineated. It seems possible, for instance, to call “Industry:
Telecommunication”, “Org: Telecommunication”, and vice versa. There are 109 dis-
tinct Org entries, and they account for 309 attacks. There are 306 distinct Target
Classes with the “Org” prefix, and 1,078 attacks with an Attack Class containing
an “Industry” prefix. Together, that is 1,384 attacks, 36% of the entire database.
To this researcher, there seems to be small difference qualitatively between the cat-
egorizations of “Industry”-prefixed and “Org” -prefixed target classes: the former is
associated with private business, whereas the latter generally refers to political, reli-
gious, or nonprofit groups. In monthly attack volume, they are moderately correlated
(r = 0.476,p = 0.000), as shown in 5.3. Graphically, they are also fairly similar,
as shown in figure 5.17. Besides the “Org” and “Industry” prefix ambiguity, there
is ambiguity and overlap among sectors themselves. For instance, the TargetClass
labels “News”, “News (Bitcoin)”, “Industry: News” and “Industry: News and Pub-
lishing” are all different labels that ostensibly reference an attack against the same
sector. Additionally, some attacks target multiple sectors, in which the “TargetClass”
is recorded simply as “> 1”, omitting any information about the particular sectors
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Country A Country B r p-value
TR PH 0.458 0.001
AU IT -0.366 0.009
IT DE -0.356 0.011
JP CN 0.339 0.016
US JP 0.326 0.021
SA CN 0.324 0.022
IT PK -0.318 0.024
US CN 0.309 0.029
RU JP 0.305 0.031
IL PK 0.297 0.037
CA PK -0.294 0.038
IN PK 0.289 0.042
IN CN 0.268 0.059
KR NL 0.268 0.059
US TR 0.265 0.063
IN TR 0.264 0.064
IL IT -0.264 0.064
US DE 0.251 0.079
US RU 0.246 0.086
FR PH 0.244 0.088
Table 5.1: The top 20 country-to-country correlation and p-values of the
top 20 targets of cyber attacks, arranged in ascending order by p-value.
The full list of cross country correlations is in table 5.1
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Figure 5.17: Attacks Timeline for Industry and Org Sectors.
affected, which seems unhelpful. These inconsistencies makes data analysis against
target sectors very difficult. For this reason, I focus mainly on the sectors in table
Figure 5.18: Attacks Timeline for > 1 Label
5.2, excluding the label “> 1”.
I now explain why “> 1” is not very helpful in this particular analysis. The
label “> 1” is the 6th most targeted sector label, but it is not correlated in any
statistically significant way to any of the most targeted sectors, nor is it correlated
with total attacks. This indicates that attacks of a broad scope are not randomly
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distributed amongst all attacks, but they are also independent of attacks against
any other significantly targeted sector. They represent a significant portion of cyber
attacks, but do not occur in similar frequencies to other popular target sectors; broad
attacks are their own beast entirely. For reference I show their behavior in figure 5.18.
They could be analyzed by other means, such as the type of attack, “Attack”, such as
“DDOS”, “Defacement”, or by “AttackClass”, such as “CC” (Cyber Crime), or “CW”
(Cyber Warfare). But broad attacks do not seem to be related to any other important
target sectors. This cyber attacks database supports a near infinite combinations of
queries for knowledge discovery, but only a fraction of them are presented in this
thesis.
Sector Total Attacks
Various Industries 1078
Government 592
Individuals 440
Org 306
Education 245
> 1 198
Health Care 175
Finance 167
News 94
Table 5.2: The 9 most targeted sectors between January 2014 and February
2018, arranged in descending order by attack volume.
Perhaps these ambiguities will be ameliorated in future reports, as Passeri has
decided to make future reports in line with the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC), as stated in his Feb 2018 blog post [61]. Indeed, this new
classification scheme seems to be the case in all of the cyber attacks Passeri has
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recorded for 2018 so far, as shown by querying the attack database I have created
with Passeri’s data, as shown in figure 5.19. The effort undermines itself because it
includes both the ISIC code and its associated label. If this is changed, it will greatly
aid future studies, but for now, the vast majority of data collected uses the older
ad hoc naming convention. Because the sector labels have changed starting January
2018, I present data only from January 2014 through December 2018.
Figure 5.19: ISIC Compliant Target Classes
Though the attacks have now been put into a database, the ad hoc naming conven-
tion previously used for the “TargetClass” column makes querying the data difficult.
Many sectors have been well-delineated, and those that have not have been grouped
into the “Industries” and “Org” categories as previously described. Though “Indus-
try” and “Org” are only prefixes to the specific sector, such as “Telecom”, erring on
the side of inclusion helps to make inferences on a grander scale, such as the threat
to the private sector in general. To get around this inconsistency, targeted queries
similar to figure 5 are used to get accurate counts of attacks against a particular
industry.
To understand how attack volume against one sector is related to others, I have
created a correlation matrix containing r and p values, as done in the previous section.
As I have previously described the creation of the countries correlation table, table
5.1, I remove the diagonal, and the duplicated data on one side of the diagonal.
After arranging the correlations in a columnar layout in descending order of p value,
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table 5.3 is the result. Because of the complex nature of the motivation behind cyber
attacks, one cannot say that the volume of cyber attacks that one sector receives is the
cause or effect of the volume of cyber attacks that another sector receives. However,
this study allows us to see the shifting priorities of black hat hackers in general.
One insight we can gain from table 5.3 is that the attacks received by individuals
and the attacks received against various industries are strongly inversely correlated
(r = −0.595,p = 0.000), and are actually the most strongly correlated sectors, by
absolute value. As the private sector in general experiences fewer cyber attadcks,
individuals experience more, and vice versa. This can be visualized in figure 5.20. As
Figure 5.20: Attacks Timeline for Attacks Against Individuals and Indus-
try Sectors
I show in this figure, there is an overall trend of attacks against industry decreasing
while attacks against individuals increase. In addition to this long view of the be-
havior, there are also months in which the cyber attacks against industry and cyber
attacks against individuals are at odds. For instance, in December 2014 industry sees
a global maximum of attack volume, and individuals are near a global minimum. In
May 2015, attack volume against industry reaches a local minimum as attack volume
against individuals reaches a local maximum. The converse is true in June 2014. In
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August 2018, the month in which overall cyber attacks peaked over the 4 year period,
both attacks against industry and attacks against individuals reach a local maximum.
Afterwards, they start diverging, and by July 2017, attacks against individuals have
overtaken those attacks against industry.
The 2nd strongest correlation, shown in table 5.3 is between individuals and the
health care sector. This is also the strongest positive correlation. In figure 5.21 I
compare their monthly attack volume. They both share a global maximum in De-
cember 2017, local maxima in August 2014, January 2016, August 2016 (at the peak
of all cyber attacks), and April 2017. Though they are strongly correlated and have
both grown on average, attacks against individuals have grown much more quickly;
starting March 2017 through the end of the year, individuals have received at least
twice as many cyber attacks as the entire health care industry. This may be because
of the similar goals between attacks against health care institutions and individuals,
namely personally identifiable information (PII). Out of the 175 cyber attacks against
the health care sector, 42 were of the of the attack class (“Attack” column) “Account
Hijacking”, or 24%. This ratio with respect to attacks against individuals is 35%,
whereas in industry, a target sector inversely correlated to individuals, only 10% of
all cyber attacks are via account hijacking. Evidently, the type of attack varies greatly
between sectors, and health car and individual targets are similarly attacked for user
account information.
The Industry and Government sectors are also strongly correlated (r = 0.548,
p = 0.000) in table 5.3. I show in figure 5.22 the monthly attack volume against
both sectors. Both sectors seem to be y-shifted versions of one another from January
2014 - July 2014, and then start to exhibit more independence. Overall, both rapidly
declined since January 2017, in contrast to the previously discussed attacks against
individuals, which have skyrocketed. However, total cyber attacks overall have not
behaved this way, as previously shown in figure 5.1. What naturally emerges from
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Figure 5.21: Attacks Timeline for Individuals and Health Care sectors
Figure 5.22: Attacks Timeline for Government and Industry Sectors, the
top 2 targeted sectors.
these data is the notion of a loose conservation of cyber attacks; as one victim is
ignored to some degree, others are targeted more frequently and to similar degree.
Of course, this is a loose conservation, because the total volume of cyber attacks also
fluctuates, but the targets, be they sectors or countries, fluctuate much more, often
in complementary fashion, when there exists at least a moderate inverse correlation
of attack volume between targets, as government and industry are in figure 5.23. .
In general, it seems that hackers are targeting industries and governments less and
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Figure 5.23: Attacks Timeline for Government and Individuals.
targeting individuals more.
Attacks against individuals and the financial sector are also moderately correlated
(r = 0.446, p = 0.001). Their monthly totals are shown in figure 5.24. . Their
Figure 5.24: Attacks Timeline for Individuals and Finance sectors
correlation is somewhat more difficult to see, as the locations of their local minima
and local maxima often do not align. All that can be said is that when individuals are
attacked more frequently, the financial market is often attacked more frequently as
well. May 2016 represents the highest attack against financial markets over the 4 year
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period, in which it experienced 15 attacks, more than 4 times the average monthly
attack rate. At least 3 of these attacks were against the SWIFT banking network,
whose total losses from attacks 2015-2016 are in the millions [27]. SWIFT came under
greater scrutiny after $81 million was stolen from one of its banks in Bangladesh in
February 2016 [27].
5.3 Socioeconomic Factors
The results of analyzing the correlation between socioeconomic factors of a country
and the total cyber attacks received imply that no one factor is even moderately
correlated to cyber attack volume. The origin and meaning of these socioeconomic
factors is previously discussed in section 4.1. This corroborates the findings of Solano’s
“Socio-economic factors in Cybercrime” [64]. Solano’s work examines more specific
relationships between socioeconomic factors of individual countries and their cyber
attack volume. I find that A few socioeconomic measures are weakly correlated with
cyber attack volume, as I show in table 5.4. Population (r = 0.208,p = 0.009) and
GDP (r = 0.179,p = 0.027) are the factors most correlated to cyber attack volume.
As GDP and population both represent resources for an entire country, this makes
sense. In contrast, other socioeconomic factors which are not correlated to cyber
attack volume, such as generosity (r = 0.133,p = 0.125), or the belief that people
can be trusted (r = 0.134,p = 0.335), represent qualities of a group, but are not
considered resources.
Because the US is so anomalous in its extreme volume of cyber attacks, it can
be helpful to see how socioeconomic factors correlate with cyber attack volume with
the US removed. The result is figure 5.5. Comparing this table to the previous one,
the US changes things considerably. By simply removing the US, the correlation
between population and cyber attacks received jumps from 0.208 to 0.360, and its
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p-value is decimated. Removing the US also takes the correlation between healthy life
expectancy from r = 0.131, p = 0.114 to r = 0.299, p = 0.000, and similar effects are
found in other correlates as well. This suggests that certain socioeconomic conditions
of the US make are not as correlated to cyber attack volume as the same conditions
are in other countries. Removing the US as an outlier can help see trends it obscures.
The lower and upper confidence intervals of the happiness score shed some light
on how the distribution of happiness scores correlate to cyber attack volume received.
The narrower the interval is, the more uniform the distribution is. The lower confi-
dence interval’s positive correlation with cyber attacks received could be interpreted
as a side effect of either a higher happiness score or a narrower distribution of hap-
piness scores. To examine this idea more closely, I analyze the correlation between
the size of the confidence interval of happiness score (Higher Confidence Interval of
Happiness - Lower Confidence Interval of Happiness) and cyber attacks received. The
result is r = −0.242, p = 0.003. This suggests that there is at least a weak inverse cor-
relation between the size of the confidence interval for happiness and cyber attacks. If
the happiness interval is very small, it means that most surveyed report similar hap-
piness levels. Thus, societies in which most people are similarly happy have smaller
confidence intervals of happiness, and receive more cyber attacks. This may be a
counterintuitive example, as one may expect large confidence intervals with regard
to happiness to correlate with income inequality and other social inequalities, which
may in turn correlate to universally deleterious outcomes, of which cyber attacks are
one. The idea that greater variance in happiness correlates with fewer cyber attacks
may be explained by more complex socioeconomic forces. For instance, a wider confi-
dence interval of happiness moderately correlates with the sentiment that people can
be trusted with values r = −0.445, p = 0.002. And the sentiment that people can
be trusted is moderately correlated with cyber attack volume. Intuitively, it can be
observed that the more disparity between happiness recorded, the less people trust
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each other. In a dystopia it could be the case that a few powerful people are very
happy, and the rest are very unhappy, in which case the confidence interval would
be very large, and people would not trust each other very much. In general, when
these results seem unintuitive, one possible way to understand these correlations may
be indirect results which can be explained by other more intuitive correlations. For
another example, the happiness confidence interval size is inversely correlated with
healthy life expectancy at birth (r = −0.221, p = 0.008), which in turn is correlated
with increased cyber attacks (r = 0.299, p = 0.000). This is more intuitive, because a
greater life expectancy is generally associated with wealthy countries who experience
more cyber attacks. This intuition is confirmed in that life expectancy is strongly
positively correlated with the log GDP per capita with r = 0.811, p = 0.000. Many
of these seemingly disparate socioeconomic features of a society indicate the assets
that a society has, and therefore, the value of launching a cyber attack.
Another important aspect about socioeconomic conditions is the unique patterns
to attacks against certain countries. For instance, in 3 of 4 years in question in this
study, Great Britain received its peak cyber attacks in November, as previously shown
in figure 5.4 implying a heightened risk to GB leading up to holiday shopping season.
In 2016 Great Britain had 2 maxima: one in the predictable November spot, and
one in June, when the Brexit vote was held [39], it is possible that it is coincidental,
or that general social tension is correlated with a greater volume of cyber attacks
received.
Election cycles can also play a large role in cyber attack volume. India’s most
recent general election occurred in April - May 2014 [62], and 3 months prior to this,
India’s cyber attack volume reached a maximum for the entire 4 year period, also
illustrated in figure 5.4. The US also experienced a similar influx of cyber attacks
at a similar time relative to a major election. Over the 4 year period, cyber attack
volume against the US reached a maximum 3 months before the November 2016
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election, as shown in figure 5.2.
Alternatively, some attacks do not aim to change an election outcome, but to
protest it. As shown in figure 5.6, Israel’s maximum cyber attacks received occurs in
April 2015. In 2 ways these attacks against Israel are different than both the attacks
around the Indian and American elections. Firstly, the individual attacks are clearly
politically motivated by their descriptions. Of the 9 attacks in April 2015, 6 attacks
are coordinated under the #OpIsrael tag, 1 is carried out by the Palestinian hacker
group “Gaza Team” defacing government sites with pro-ISIS propaganda, 1 attacks
Israeli military networks, and 1 attacks the Israeli arms importer and manufacturer
Fab-Defense. Secondly, these attacks follow the election, rather than precede it.
These attackers are not trying to influence an election or taking advantage of the
socioeconomic condition for profit; they are likely protesting the recent controversial
election of Prime Minister Netanyahu.
5.4 Attack Classes
We break down attack classes into 4 groups based on Passeri’s categorization: Hack-
tivism (H), Cyber Crime (CC), Cyber Espionage (CE), and Cyber Warfare (CW).
These classes are not a universal set of accepted distinctions, and may sometimes over-
lap, but they describe the goal of a cyber attack fairly well. They correspond with
the goals of a socio-political advantage (Hacktivism), a financial advantage (Cyber
Crime), an informational advantage (Cyber Espionage), and an operational advan-
tage (Cyber Warfare). The monthly attack volume of all 4 classes are illustrated in
figure 5.25. Cyber crime accounts for most attacks reported, by a large margin. They
peak just before and just after the 2016 US Presidential election, with a local mini-
mum spanning 2.5 years (May 2015 - December 2018) between peaks. It is almost as
if cyber criminals got tired and decided to take some time off.
54
Figure 5.25: Attacks Timeline for All Attack Classes
Another interesting feature is that hacktivism reported plummets from a couple
dozen attacks per month in the beginning of 2014 to zero reported hacktivism attacks
since August 2015. This is probably not because of a lack of knowledge, as hacktivist
activity is generally noticed in cyber security news. However, it may be difficult to
classify an attack as related to hacktivism in certain situations. For example, there is
an entry in the Hackmageddon data May 4, 2015, whose description reads, “A con-
struction sign is hacked at the University of Montana, inviting users to “Smoke Weed
Everyday”.” The attack class is “Unknown”. However, Montana had been a hotbed
for political struggle over legalizing marijuana for many years [28]. This struggle came
to a head in May, in which bipartisan legislation was introduced in the form of the
Merkley-Daines amendment, which would allow doctors to recommend marijuana to
veterans. It is reasonable to assume that the motivation was hacktivism, and that
many other incidents are unnoticed, and confused for vandalism for vandalism’s sake.
Defacement is on the decline, and to some extent, DDoS attacks are also on decline.
As a reminder, these numbers do not say anything about the number of individuals
or machines affected; this means that it is possible that fewer attacks occur at a time
when more widespread attacks occur, affecting more individuals and machines.
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Cyber warfare is very minimal and erratic, while cyber espionage is slowly in-
creasing. Cyber warfare pits very sophisticated government-sponsored groups known
as “advanced persistent threats” (APT’s) against another country. The aggressor
APT does not want to be disclosed in fear the country may seem malicious. Often,
the victim country will not want to disclose an exposure for fear of appearing weak.
Because the sophistication of these attacks, and their mutual concealment, events of
cyber warfare may be the most concealed. Thus the Hackmageddon data likely only
discloses a very small sample of the actual attacks countries pit against one another.
5.5 Attack Vectors
We show the most common attacks are in table 5.6. Their monthly totals are shown
in figure 5.26. Account hijacking is the exfiltration of login credentials. Malware is
unauthorized software running on a machine. Targeted attacks are a broad category of
attacks that seek to compromise a system, often a piece of infrastructure, as when, in
2015, it was revealed that in 2013, a group of Iranian hackers had penetrated the online
control system of a New York dam through a cellular modem [44]. SQL injection
attacks occur when a user is able to directly manipulate SQL commands through a
web form, thereby injecting malicious statements. DDoS is a distributed denial of
service, in which many machines make requests to a server at once, overwhelming the
server, making it unavailable. Defacement is hacking a website to change its content,
and is a frequent result of hacktivist activity.
Unknown attacks peak in August 2016, the peak of the attacks on the US, and the
global maximum of all attacks. Unknown attacks are those in which the technological
means of the attack are not specified. The reason for it being unknown may be
from the victim’s true ignorance, or the victim may kept it secret for fear of the
vulnerability being taken advantage of again. Account hijacking has been slowly
56
increasing, and malware has increased dramatically, eclipsing unknown attacks as the
dominant threat.
Figure 5.26: Attacks Timeline for All Attack Types, as a 6 month rolling
average
5.6 Apriori Results
To answer the 3rd question of this thesis, “What else can we learn about trends in
cyber attacks?”, we use the Apriori algorithm to discover frequent grouping of at-
tack variables. To prepare a dataframe for the Aprior algorithm, each of the most
popular values of ‘TargetClass’, ‘TargetCountry’, ‘AttackClass’, and ‘Attack’ are rep-
resented in a column of a pandas dataframe. The US is excluded because its over-
whelming prevalence obscures other relationships. The columns are, ‘TargetClass:
Education’, ‘TargetClass: Government’, ‘TargetClass: Individuals’, ‘TargetClass: In-
dustry’, ‘TargetClass: Finance’, ‘TargetClass: HealthCare’, ‘TargetClass: News’,
‘TargetClass: Org’, ‘Attack: DDoS’, ‘Attack: SQLInjection’, ‘Attack: AccountHi-
jacking’, ‘Attack: Targeted’, ‘AttackClass: Hacktivism’, ‘AttackClass: CyberCrime’,
‘AttackClass: CyberEspionage’, ‘AttackClass: CyberWarfare’, ‘TargetCountry: GB’,
‘TargetCountry: CA’, ‘TargetCountry: AU’, ‘TargetCountry: RU’, ‘TargetCountry:
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KR’, ‘TargetCountry: FR’, ‘TargetCountry: UA’, ‘TargetCountry: JP’, ‘TargetCoun-
try: IT’,‘TargetCountry: DE’, ‘TargetCountry: PK’, ‘TargetCountry: BR’, ‘Target-
Country: TR’, ‘TargetCountry: NL’, ‘TargetCountry: SA’, ‘TargetCountry: India’,
‘TargetCountry: PH’. Each row represents 3 consecutive days from January 2014 -
December 2017, a total of 487 rows. The data value ‘1’ is placed in a cell if an attack
with the target value occurred within that specific 3 day period, and ‘0’ otherwise.
The results, in tables A.2, A.3, and A.4, use an abbreviated form of original column
names: ‘AC’ for ‘AttackClass’, ‘A’: for ‘Attack’, ‘TC’ for ‘TargetClass’, and ‘TCo’
for ‘TargetCountry’. We focus on support, which is simply the frequency that the
union of the antecedents and consequents occurs in a dataset. A full explanation of
the interpretation of Apriori results can be found in previous works [23] [30] [24]. The
results in table A.2 imply that within 3 day intervals January 2014 - December 2017,
the most features of attacks most frequently occurring are that they are financially
destructive incidents (Cyber Crime) against the private sector (Industry). In any 3
day period over the time line, both occur 56% of the time.
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Sector A Sector B r p-value
Individuals Industry -0.595 0.000
Individuals Health Care 0.562 0.000
Government Industry 0.548 0.000
Industry Org 0.476 0.000
Individuals Finance 0.446 0.001
Health Care News -0.360 0.010
Government Individuals -0.348 0.013
Government Org 0.346 0.014
Government Finance -0.345 0.014
Individuals Org -0.341 0.015
Industry Finance -0.339 0.016
Individuals News -0.326 0.021
Industry Health Care -0.283 0.046
Finance Health Care 0.258 0.070
Industry News 0.234 0.103
News > 1 -0.233 0.104
Finance Org -0.225 0.116
Individuals > 1 0.199 0.167
Government News 0.151 0.294
News Org 0.150 0.298
Education Individuals -0.140 0.332
Government Health Care -0.137 0.342
Education News 0.099 0.496
Government > 1 -0.092 0.523
Table 5.3: Cross-industry attack volume correlations among the top 7
sectors (“TargetClass” field), sorted in ascending order by p-value.
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Socio-Economic Factor r p-value
Population 0.208 0.009
GDP 0.179 0.027
Lower Confidence Interval of Happiness 0.173 0.033
Happiness Score 0.172 0.034
Upper Confidence Interval of Happiness 0.170 0.036
Happiness Rank -0.167 0.040
Log GDP per Capita 0.175 0.041
Healthy Life Expectancy at Birth 0.131 0.114
Generosity 0.133 0.125
Delivery Quality 0.408 0.147
Positive Affect 0.109 0.199
Freedom To Make Life Choices 0.098 0.247
Social Support 0.092 0.274
People Can Be Trusted 0.134 0.335
Confidence In Government -0.062 0.488
Perception Of Corruption -0.046 0.597
Democratic Quality 0.026 0.929
Negative Affect -0.004 0.962
Table 5.4: Socio-Economic Correlates of Total Cyber Attack Volume Re-
ceived 2014-2017 in ascending order by p-value.
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Socioeconomic Factor r p-value
Population 0.360 0.000
Healthy Life Expectancy at Birth 0.299 0.000
Log GDP per Capita 0.297 0.000
Lower Confidence Interval of Happiness 0.281 0.000
Happiness Score 0.274 0.001
Happiness Rank -0.273 0.001
Upper Confidence Interval for Happiness 0.268 0.001
GDP 0.238 0.003
People Can Be Trusted 0.383 0.005
Generosity 0.145 0.095
Perception Of Corruption -0.144 0.097
Delivery Quality 0.408 0.147
Social Support 0.121 0.150
Freedom To Make Life Choices 0.111 0.192
Negative Affect -0.075 0.372
Positive Affect 0.076 0.374
Confidence In Government 0.008 0.925
Democratic Quality 0.026 0.929
Table 5.5: Socio-Economic Correlates of Total Cyber Attack Volume Re-
ceived 2014-2017 Excluding the US in ascending order by p-value.
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Attack Number of Recorded Attacks As
Unknown 1010
Account Hijacking 507
Malware 463
Targeted Attack 449
SQL Injection 349
DDoS 339
Defacement 317
Table 5.6: The most common attack types.
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Chapter 6
DISCUSSION
In general, cyber attacks have a range of motivations, from monetary gain, political
change, or simply spite, and other works have studied these [50]. In this study I
cannot make a detailed conclusion of these motivations. Instead, I focus on the
larger implications of each section. The main conclusions can be summarized in the
following:
1. Countries with higher population, GDP, happiness, and other metrics that relate
to resources are attacked somewhat more often.
2. There is an overall shift from attacking governments and businesses towards
attacking individuals, even when political or financial gain is the object of the
attack.
3. Malware has become the dominating threat in terms of number of attacks
recorded in cyber security news.
The 1st point is supported by previous cyber security research, in which GDP per
capita is moderately correlated (r = 0.42, p < 0.001) [33]. The 2nd point has not
been examined. The 3rd point is supported by industry reports of a recent doubling
of malware against IoT devices [20] and an overall decrease in DDoS attacks [11].
6.1 Countries
The data collected about attacks directed toward a country in particular is minuscule,
and does not accurately estimate the true number of cyber attacks occurring. This
is because most attacks are not recorded, and many of the recorded attacks are not
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publicized for fear of making the target person, corporation, country, or government
appear weak. Nevertheless, the biases inherent in the collection of these attacks seem
self-consistent. There are no observable changes in these biases, and a small sample
of attacks against countries with more recorded attacks can inform us of how cyber
attack volume truly changed, and what can be expected in the future.
The US is the most consistent with other studies. By this study, the US is the
most attacked country, and this conforms to Kumar’s account in “Approaches to
understanding the motivations behind cyber attacks” [50]. Kumar also found that
China was attacked with DDoS the 2nd most. However, my findings indicate that
China is only attacked by DDoS the 16th most, and is attacked overall the 11th most.
As Kumar’s findings use www.digitalattackmap.com [6] which directly records DDoS
attacks as they happen, and mine rely on security reports, their numbers are much
more accurate. However, from their limited recorded attacks, and the moderate
correlation between attacks against China and Japan, we can say that their similar
geography and economy make their cyber attacks tightly coupled. For instance, when
the Yen and the Chinese stock market plummeted in January 2016 [2], China and
Japan both saw their global maxima in cyber attacks 2014-2017 occur that month
5.13 . This demonstrates the surprising power of incomplete data when sampled
consistently.
Great Britain is the 2nd most attacked country according to this study, and in 3 of
4 years, its annual maximum of attacks received occurs in November. This is again,
using a very incomplete dataset, but it strongly implies that Great Britain’s cyber
attacks are cyclical, and are generally tied to the holiday shopping season.
The weak inverse relationship (r = 0.294, p = 0.038) between attacks received by
Pakistan and attacks received by Canada may seem perplexing. Because of its small
sample size and surprising result, it is tempting to consider this finding in figure 5.12
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a fluke . However, accurate relationships have been found in other small sample sets,
and the correlation is weak, so perhaps it is not so unusual after all.
On average, Pakistan and India seem periodic, maximizing on average in October
in figure 5.9. They are geographically similar, and in mutual conflict, which is not
surprising. This average is disproportionately influenced by the cyber attack volume
of October 2014, which was a global maximum for both countries as implied by figure
5.14. Another interesting result in figure 5.14 is that the Indian elections, which only
occurred once 2014-2017, occurred March through April [16], and one of India’s 2
attack volume maxima occurred 3 months prior, in January. Four of January 2014’s
8 attacks against India target the government directly. This maximization of cyber
attacks received around 3 months prior to a national election also occurred in the
2016 US Presidential election. So it is reasonable to expect that 3 months before a
contentious election, cyber attacks may increase.
6.2 Sectors
The clearest observation is that attacks against various industries are dereasing and
attacks against individuals are increasing, as figure 5.20 illustrates. Attacks against
individuals and industry are also the most correlated by absolute value, (r = −0.595,
p = 0.000). There seems to be a systematic shift towards attacking individuals, the
largest share of which are account hijacking (31%), followed by malware (30%). Of
account hijacking against individuals, (14%) were Twitter account hijacking. This is
indicative of the types of trends to anticipate in the coming years.
Cyber attack volume against various industries and government sectors, as shown
in figure 5.22, are very similar (r = 0.548, p = 0.000). For the first 6 months they look
like y-shifted versions of one another, and have the same sign of their first derivative;
an increase in one means an increase in another. All this indicates that attackers
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target governments and the private sector at similar times, perhaps due to a tight
coupling of politics and the economy of the US, the most attacked nation.
Attacks against several sectors (> 1) make up a small portion of attacks in figure
5.18, but are on the rise, quadrupling between 2014 and 2017. In addition to the
graphs in section 5.2, the change in attacks against the most targeted sectors can be
understood through table 6.1. For clarification, the “Organizations” category includes
political parties and religious groups, which are neither private sector nor government
agencies.
Sector 2014 January-June 2017 July-December
Individuals 4% 31%
Industry 34% 18%
Government 19% 10%
Healthcare 5% 8%
> 1 2% 8%
Finance 3% 5%
Organizations 10% 4%
Education 7% 4%
Table 6.1: Contrast of the attacks by sector at the beginning half of 2014
and the last half of 2017.
Another way to profile these attacks against different sectors is to examine the
type of attack most likely to occur in each sector, as shown in tables 6.2, 6.3 6.4
These data all imply that substantial portion of future attacks will target individ-
uals, and this trend will continue to grow.
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Attack % of Attacks Against Individuals
Account Hijacking 31%
Malware 30%
Unknown 9%
Targeted Attack 7%
Malvertising 5%
Defacement 2%
Mobile Malware 1%
Table 6.2: Types of attacks against individuals, by percentage.
Attack % of Attacks Against Industry
Unknown 31%
Account Hijacking 10%
SQL Injection 10%
Malware 10%
DDoS 9%
Targeted Attack 7%
Point of Sale Malware 7%
Table 6.3: Types of attacks against industry, by percentage.
6.3 Socioeconomic Factors
From the results obtained, there are no strong correlations between any of the socioe-
conomic factors and an increase cyber attacks received, with a moderate correlation
for only 3 factors. This difficulty is corroborated in Solano’s “Socio-economic factors
in cybercrime”, which also does not find any strong correlations between socioeco-
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Attack % of Attacks Against Governments
Targeted Attack 23%
Defacement 22%
Unknown 18%
DDoS 14%
SQL Injection 6%
Malware 5%
Account Hijacking 5%
Table 6.4: Types of Attacks Against Governments, by percentage.
nomic factors and cyber attacks received across all countries [64]. The top 3 socioeco-
nomic factors that elevate the likelihood of cyber attacks are population (r = 0.360,
p = 0.000), healthy life expectancy at birth (r = 0.299,p = 0.000), and log(GDP)
per capita (r = 0.297, p = 0.000). Some of these categories that imply more cyber
attacks are also at least weakly correlated to GDP closely tied to GDP. Healthy life ex-
pectancy is strongly correlated with log GDP per capita with (r = 0.811, p = 0.000),
and happiness score is weakly correlated with log GDP per capita with (r = 0.171,
p = 0.035). However, population is not correlated with log GDP per capita at all
(r = −0.032, p = 0.714), indicating that attackers view people as a distinct resource
on their own. More generally, the factors that matter are resources that malefactors
can subvert. Those resources are the number of human beings and the money that
a country holds. This makes sense, as the target of cyber attacks is often direct
monetary gain, or account hijacking, which can then be used for monetary gain by
using card payment information or through extorting the victims. Happier countries
are attacked more often, with a correlation between happiness score and number of
attacks received. Including the US, the correlation is (r = 0.293, p = 0.001); exclud-
ing the US the correlation is (r = 0.183, p = 0.035). In general, countries with more
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citizens, happier citizens, and more wealthy citizens are targeted more often.
6.4 Attack Classes
Over the span of the study 2014-2017, cyber crime has always dominated other attack
classes, and continues to grow, as shown in 5.25. This asymmetry is likely because
hacktivism is truly does represent a small slice of the pie, and cyber espionage and
cyber warfare are not generally reported. Cyber crime is most likely a large source
of cyber attacks, but the large gap between cyber crime and other attack classes is
indicative of the culture of secrecy around cyber warfare and cyber espionage.
6.5 Attack Vectors
The peak of all attacks which occurred 3 months prior the US Presidential elections
is also where cyber activity starts to change dramatically 5.26. Unknown attacks
plummet, DDoS, SQL Injection, and Defacement attacks also taper off. Targeted
attacks and account hijacking do not deviate much, but malware increases dramati-
cally, so much so that December 2017 sees 5 times the number of malware reports as
the average from the start of the study in 2014 until August 2016. Because malware
is more associated with attacks against individuals, this larger trend implies as much
about who is targeted as it implies about how they are being targeted.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
Throughout this thesis I have analyzed cyber attack volume as a function of time,
attack type, method of attack, target country, target sector, country to country rela-
tionships, socioeconomic factors, and have discovered tentative but meaningful corre-
lations in various factors of the victims of cyber attacks. Furthermore, I accomplished
this using only freely available data sources. I discovered that annually sampled so-
cioeconomic statistics are difficult to correlate with cyber attack volume received,
but GDP per capita and population play the strongest roles. Despite this tenu-
ous relationship, the largest spikes in cyber attack volume are tied to socioeconomic
events, namely contentious elections, political corruption, and stock market dives.
The volume of future attacks will continue to increase, more often targeting individ-
uals directly, affecting wealthier more populous nations including the US and China,
and more often take the form of malware. The imminent ubiquity of the Internet of
Things (IoT) will present new challenges to security as easier systems to compromise,
a wider attack vector, and higher value objectives, such as home surveillance, and
interference with physical systems, such as power plants, as well as consumer devices.
Therefore, it is extremely important that the security research community knows as
much as possible about trends in cyber attacks.
From the results which point to increased cyber attacks preceding contentious
elections, I expect the US and the world to experience the most attacks of 2018 in
August, preceding the US midterm elections. For the same reason, I also expect
August 2020, preceding the US presidential election to have the highest volume of
cyber attacks in the US and worldwide. The economy has been rocked recently, and
that is often a predictor of cyber attacks. As President Trump has pulled out of the
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Paris Climate Accord, has considered pulling out of NAFTA, and recently imposed
large tariffs on steel, aluminum, and other goods to allies in the EU, Canada, and
Mexico [53]. The announcement of these tariffs recently dipped dramatically, as the
Wall Street Journal notes, “Nasdaq was down 6.54 percent, marking their biggest
weekly percentage falls since January 2016” [32]. Dramatic US economic changes like
these will likely precipitate a higher volume of cyber attacks, as I occurred with the
Chinese stock market crash described in section 6.1.
In the future, it would be very helpful obtain more accurate estimates of the
numbers and locations of cyber attacks, either using a private database, similar to
Carley’s work [33], or by devising a way to reproduce similar results through open
means. Additionally, correlating cyber attack volume with socioeconomic data on
more than an annual basis, perhaps weekly, would bring greater clarity to how a
changing socioeconomic climate directly affects cyber attack volume. Additionally, it
may be helpful to store cyber attacks in a graph database, like Neo4j, which values
relationships between entities over fast, uniform data access. In graph databases,
entities are represented by vertices, and relationships are represented by edges. For
instance, it is possible to use Neo4j’s Cypher query language to detect the longest
cycles of aggression in the following way:
MATCH p = ( at tacke r : e n t i t y )−[ l aunches ]−>(a : Attack )
−[ t a r g e t s ]−>( v ic t im : e n t i t y )−[ l aunches ]−>[b : Attack ]
−>[ t a r g e t s ]−>( a t ta cke r : e n t i t y )
WHERE ALL( a . attackDate < (b . attackDate )
AND ALL(b . attackDate − a . attackDate < 30)
RETURN p
ORDER BY l ength (p) DESC;
This of course, requires knowledge of the attacker, which is generally unknown in
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the data from Hackmageddon, and may also be unknown in the Symantec telemetry
database used in Carley’s work [33]. However, DDoS reports from Digital Attack
Map [6] generally do identify at least the country of origin, which could be taken
advantage of with a graph database.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
TABLES
Table A.1: The country-to-country correlation and p-values of the top 20
targets of cyber attacks, arranged in ascending order by p-value.
Country A Country B r p-value
TR PH 0.458 0.001
AU IT -0.366 0.009
IT DE -0.356 0.011
JP CN 0.339 0.016
US JP 0.326 0.021
SA CN 0.324 0.022
IT PK -0.318 0.024
US CN 0.309 0.029
RU JP 0.305 0.031
IL PK 0.297 0.037
CA PK -0.294 0.038
IN PK 0.289 0.042
IN CN 0.268 0.059
KR NL 0.268 0.059
US TR 0.265 0.063
IN TR 0.264 0.064
IL IT -0.264 0.064
US DE 0.251 0.079
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Country A Country B r p-value
US RU 0.246 0.086
FR PH 0.244 0.088
IT CN -0.241 0.091
RU NL 0.241 0.092
GB CA 0.23 0.109
GB JP -0.227 0.113
PK NL -0.216 0.131
RU UA 0.215 0.133
IT PH 0.215 0.134
RU KR 0.214 0.135
IN FR -0.213 0.137
US INDIA 0.212 0.14
KR FR -0.211 0.142
IN IT -0.21 0.143
US PH 0.209 0.145
IL SA 0.202 0.16
IL KR -0.197 0.17
DE NL 0.195 0.176
IL CN 0.194 0.177
UA IT 0.191 0.185
TR CN 0.19 0.186
PK CN 0.19 0.186
IN SA 0.188 0.191
KR CN 0.186 0.196
UA PK 0.185 0.197
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Country A Country B r p-value
GB AU 0.182 0.205
AU IL 0.178 0.217
KR UA 0.174 0.227
AU JP -0.174 0.228
IL DE -0.174 0.228
RU CN 0.172 0.231
IN UA 0.17 0.237
JP NL 0.169 0.241
UA BR -0.167 0.246
GB KR -0.167 0.247
GB DE 0.165 0.252
IL NL -0.165 0.253
AU UA -0.164 0.254
FR JP -0.161 0.265
NL PH -0.158 0.274
CA NL 0.157 0.275
IL BR 0.157 0.277
CA AU 0.156 0.279
GB SA 0.148 0.306
GB CN -0.147 0.308
BR SA 0.146 0.31
UA CN 0.146 0.312
AU DE 0.145 0.314
NL SA 0.143 0.322
CA KR -0.143 0.323
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Country A Country B r p-value
KR TR -0.14 0.331
IT SA -0.139 0.334
IN DE 0.138 0.34
TR SA 0.138 0.34
CA IT 0.134 0.354
GB TR -0.132 0.359
AU SA 0.131 0.366
CA UA -0.125 0.388
FR NL -0.124 0.393
JP IT -0.123 0.395
AU RU -0.123 0.396
GB RU -0.12 0.408
CA SA 0.116 0.421
GB NL -0.116 0.422
FR TR 0.114 0.429
CA TR -0.113 0.436
IN BR -0.112 0.44
IT TR 0.109 0.45
CA BR -0.109 0.452
RU PK -0.108 0.454
DE TR -0.106 0.466
PK PH -0.104 0.471
AU KR -0.103 0.477
KR JP 0.101 0.485
AU FR 0.098 0.5
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Country A Country B r p-value
IN JP 0.098 0.5
IN RU 0.097 0.501
CA DE 0.097 0.504
CA PH 0.095 0.512
US FR 0.091 0.528
DE PH -0.091 0.53
GB IL -0.09 0.533
RU TR 0.09 0.534
KR PH -0.09 0.535
KR BR -0.088 0.543
GB INDIA 0.088 0.545
RU IL 0.086 0.552
CA FR -0.086 0.555
KR IT -0.085 0.557
AU PK 0.082 0.571
GB UA -0.079 0.586
US SA 0.078 0.591
PK BR 0.078 0.592
AU BR -0.077 0.595
US IT -0.077 0.595
US UA -0.077 0.595
DE BR 0.076 0.598
IL PH -0.076 0.598
PK TR -0.076 0.6
FR SA -0.075 0.603
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Country A Country B r p-value
BR TR 0.072 0.618
IN AU 0.071 0.626
US AU 0.07 0.628
SA PH -0.069 0.634
DE PK -0.068 0.64
RU SA -0.065 0.654
FR BR -0.064 0.658
CA RU 0.058 0.688
AU PH -0.058 0.69
GB IT -0.057 0.695
JP TR 0.056 0.7
DE SA 0.055 0.703
GB PK -0.054 0.709
CA CN -0.053 0.713
US IL -0.052 0.717
FR UA 0.052 0.72
IN PH -0.052 0.721
RU DE -0.051 0.723
CA IL -0.051 0.723
RU PH -0.051 0.726
US NL 0.05 0.732
JP SA 0.049 0.735
KR DE -0.048 0.743
GB BR -0.045 0.758
PK SA -0.044 0.761
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Country A Country B r p-value
IN NL -0.041 0.775
US PK -0.04 0.784
UA SA 0.04 0.785
NL CN 0.039 0.788
BR PH 0.039 0.79
JP PH -0.037 0.801
IN IL 0.036 0.803
AU TR -0.035 0.808
JP DE -0.032 0.826
IT NL -0.031 0.829
UA DE -0.031 0.831
US GB 0.031 0.832
FR CN 0.028 0.846
US CA 0.027 0.852
CA JP -0.027 0.853
IT BR -0.026 0.856
AU NL 0.026 0.856
FR DE 0.025 0.861
US BR 0.025 0.862
BR CN 0.025 0.866
TR NL -0.023 0.872
IN KR 0.023 0.876
UA JP -0.022 0.878
BR NL 0.021 0.884
FR PK -0.019 0.896
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Country A Country B r p-value
RU BR -0.019 0.898
UA PH 0.018 0.902
IN CA -0.017 0.908
RU FR -0.016 0.915
RU IT 0.016 0.915
JP BR -0.015 0.916
FR IT 0.015 0.916
UA NL -0.014 0.921
IL FR -0.014 0.924
UA TR -0.014 0.924
KR SA -0.013 0.928
DE CN -0.012 0.936
AU CN 0.011 0.939
JP PK 0.011 0.942
GB PH 0.01 0.943
US KR 0.01 0.947
KR PK -0.008 0.954
PH CN 0.008 0.954
IL JP 0.008 0.957
IL UA 0.005 0.971
GB FR 0.002 0.988
IL TR -0.001 0.993
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A Cons A.S. C.S. S Conf Lift Lev Conv
TC: Indus-
try
AC: Cyber
Crime
0.581 0.854 0.563 0.968 1.133 0.066 4.584
TC: Gov-
ernment
AC: Cyber
Crime
0.522 0.854 0.472 0.906 1.060 0.027 1.543
AC: Cyber
Crime
Attack:
Targeted
0.854 0.448 0.411 0.481 1.074 0.028 1.064
AC: Cyber
Crime
AC: Cyber
Espionage
0.854 0.429 0.390 0.457 1.064 0.024 1.051
AC: Cyber
Espionage
Attack:
Targeted
0.429 0.448 0.382 0.890 1.988 0.190 5.019
Table A.2: Top 5 apriori Rules associations for antecedent groups of size
1, in descending order by support. Column labels: “A” = antecedents,
“Cons” = consequents, “A.S.” = antecedent support, “C.S” = consequent
support, “S”= support, “Conf” = confidence, “Lev” = leverage, “Conv”
= conviction. Value labels: “AC” = Attack Class, “TC” = Target Class
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A Cons A.S. C.S. S Conf Lift Lev Conv
AC: Cyber
Espionage,
AC: Cyber
Crime
A: Tar-
geted
0.390 0.448 0.347 0.889 1.987 0.172 4.998
AC: Cyber
Crime,
TC: Gov-
ernment
TC: Indus-
try
0.472 0.581 0.337 0.713 1.227 0.062 1.460
AC: Cyber
Crime,
TC: Gov-
ernment
A: Tar-
geted
0.472 0.448 0.273 0.578 1.292 0.062 1.310
TC: In-
dustry,
AC: Cyber
Crime
TCo: GB 0.563 0.357 0.271 0.482 1.348 0.070 1.240
AC: Cyber
Crime, A:
Targeted
TC: Indus-
try
0.411 0.581 0.271 0.660 1.136 0.032 1.232
Table A.3: Top 5 apriori Rules associations for antecedent groups of size
2, in descending order by support. Column labels: “A” = antecedents,
“Cons” = consequents, “A.S.” = antecedent support, “C.S” = consequent
support, “S”= support, “Conf” = confidence, “Lev” = leverage, “Conv”
= conviction. Value labels: “TCo” = Target Country.
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A Cons A.S. C.S. S Conf Lift Lev Conv
AC: Cyber
Espionage,
AC: CC,
TC: Gov
A: Tar-
geted
0.261 0.448 0.240 0.921 2.058 0.124 7.0150
TC: I, AC:
CC, AC:
CE
A: Tar-
geted
0.248 0.448 0.226 0.909 2.031 0.115 6.076
TC: I, AC:
CC, TC:
Gov
A: Tar-
geted
0.337 0.448 0.187 0.555 1.240 0.036 1.241
TC: I, TC:
Gov
AC: CC 0.345 0.854 0.337 0.976 1.143 0.0421 6.123
AC: CE,
AC: CC,
TC: Gov
TC: I 0.261 0.581 0.179 0.685 1.179 0.027 1.330
Table A.4: Top 5 apriori Rules associations for antecedent groups of size
3, in descending order by support. Column labels: “A” = antecedents,
“Cons” = consequents, “A.S.” = antecedent support, “C.S” = consequent
support, “S”= support, “Conf” = confidence, “Lev” = leverage, “Conv”
= conviction. Value labels: “TCo” = Target Country, “CC” = Cyber
Crime, “E” = Espionage, “Gov” = Government, “I” = Industry .
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